Hogan Lovells 2024 Election Impact and Congressional Outlook Report
The antitrust enforcement agenda of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ or the Antitrust Division) during President Donald Trump’s second term may, at least at the start, be shaped less by what the agencies are doing differently, and more by what they are undoing. Under the leadership of FTC Chair Lina Khan and Antitrust Division Assistant Attorney General (AAG) Jonathan Kanter, the agencies pursued a far-reaching antitrust enforcement agenda, introducing new and revised policies and challenging mergers as well as conduct on the basis of novel and unorthodox theories of competitive harm. It is anticipated that leadership of the antitrust agencies in the second Trump administration will walk back many of these Biden-era policies and initiatives.
Broadly, the antitrust agencies in the second Trump administration are expected to return to a focus on the consumer welfare standard. Both sitting Republican FTC Commissioners, one of whom is expected to be named acting FTC Chair promptly following Trump’s inauguration, are advocates of the consumer welfare standard.1 This would be a reversal of the philosophy of Chair Khan and AAG Kanter, who have been vocal in criticizing what they view to be the limitations of the consumer welfare standard,2 and have pushed for a more populist approach to antitrust that treats big as bad and seeks to promote economic fairness, including for small businesses and workers. However, to the extent that some of the more populist elements of Trump’s coalition are reflected in the administration’s antitrust enforcement policies, we could see the new administration pursue a more active enforcement agenda than prior Republican administrations.
Furthermore, it is an open question whether the recently-announced Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) will be successful in carrying out its mandate from President-elect Trump to “slash excess regulations, cut wasteful expenditures, and restructure Federal Agencies.”3 The most immediate risk—for both agencies—will be possible staff and budget reductions, which could hamper the agencies’ efforts to pursue a robust antitrust enforcement agenda.
Below we discuss what’s next for antitrust enforcement in the United States, and how the FTC and DOJ in the second Trump administration may tackle some of the most hot-button topics in U.S. antitrust enforcement.
President-elect Trump is tasked with appointing two top antitrust enforcers: a new FTC Chair and a new AAG to lead the Antitrust Division. Who President-elect Trump will nominate to replace the agency heads is being hotly debated, with rumors already swirling regarding potential nominees. In view of the rapid pace with which President Trump is aiming to put in place top officials in his incoming administration, and given the fact the Republicans have a Senate majority, the new agency heads may be nominated and confirmed by the Senate more quickly this time around than in his first administration. Even so, the confirmation process will take some time. Until then, at the FTC, one of the two Republican Commissioners is expected to be named acting Chair, and, if Chair Khan resigns (as is typically the case with a change in presidential leadership), there may soon be two Republican Commissioners and two Democratic Commissioners until a replacement is confirmed, creating an impasse for any decisions for which there is not bipartisan agreement among the Commissioners. But, between now and the inauguration, Chair Khan may accelerate plans to move ahead with new enforcement cases that are close to or ready to be put to a Commission vote while she retains a 3-2 Democratic majority.
With respect to the top job at DOJ, following reports that President-elect Trump’s nomination of Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL) for Attorney General (AG) was facing significant headwinds in the Senate,6 Gaetz announced on November 21, 2024 that he is withdrawing his nomination. Gaetz has praised FTC Chair Khan’s pursuit of an aggressive antitrust enforcement agenda, as has Vice President-elect JD Vance.7 Whether President-elect Trump’s next nominee for AG share Gaetz’s support for Chair Khan’s enforcement efforts in the tech sector remains to be seen. 8 Until a new Antitrust Division head is named and confirmed, the interim lead is unlikely to undertake any major changes or initiatives.
The antitrust agencies under the leadership of Chair Khan and AAG Kanter have implemented policies and procedures that have led to more aggressive merger enforcement. The agencies have challenged more deals in court and expressed an aversion to structural remedies,9 or any resolutions of deals with antitrust concerns that “fall short of blocking a transaction.”10
The agencies in the second Trump administration are likely to be comparatively more "merger-friendly” than in the Biden administration. However, given the populist sentiments reflected by Vice President-elect JD Vance, we are unlikely to see a wholesale walk-back of merger enforcement during the next four years. That said, we expect the antitrust agencies to agree to more divestitures in settlement agreements instead of suing to block as many cases in court.
It has been less than a year since the FTC and DOJ published updated Merger Guidelines in December 2023 (the 2023 Merger Guidelines).11 The 2023 Merger Guidelines reflect a dramatic overhaul of the way the agencies have evaluated mergers for years, and reflect the current agencies’ commitment to enhanced scrutiny of mergers across the board.
If past is prologue, the 2023 Merger Guidelines face an uncertain future in the new administration. In recent comments, Republican FTC Commissioner Holyoak cited the new guidelines’ downplaying of economic evidence and reliance on “old case law” to support her view that in the new administration, the FTC and DOJ should “strongly consider” rescinding or revising the guidelines.12
Importantly, any significant revisions would take time; it took the agencies the better part of two years to finalize the 2023 Merger Guidelines. Whether the agencies will decide to repeal the 2023 Guidelines immediately without having something ready to take their place remains to be seen, though a revival of the 2010 Guidelines could be, at the very least, an interim measure. A withdrawal without replacement, however, would not be unprecedented: under the leadership of Chair Khan, the FTC voted in 2021 to rescind the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMG)13 without any clear guidance as to what would replace them or when any replacement would be issued.14 Merging parties would face similar uncertainty if the agencies in Trump’s second term rescind the 2023 Merger Guidelines without having new guidance ready for prime time.
Some of the most boundary-pushing provisions in the 2023 Guidelines will likely face the most critical scrutiny in a Republican-led FTC and Antitrust Division. These include:
In addition, FTC and Antitrust Division leadership in Trump’s second term may reject the deemphasis in the 2023 Merger Guidelines of the distinction between the agencies’ treatment of horizontal and vertical mergers. This stemmed from the FTC’s decision, under Chair Khan, to rescind the VMG in September 2021 on the basis that the VMG contained “serious deficiencies,” specifically with respect to their “flawed discussion of the purported procompetitive benefits (i.e. efficiencies) of vertical mergers.”15 Trump antitrust enforcers are likely to re-up separate analysis for vertical transactions that acknowledges that vertical mergers are often procompetitive. However, it should be noted that the first vertical merger challenge in forty years was brought by DOJ during Trump’s first term,16 though that challenged failed. Nonetheless, the willingness of the prior Trump Administration to bring such an action may indicate that the increased scrutiny of vertical transactions by the agencies’ over the past few years could continue.
The antitrust agencies, with Republicans at the helm, are likely to move away from bringing cases alleging more novel theories of harm that have been a hallmark of Chair Khan and AAG Kanter’s enforcement agenda. New leadership may take note that the agencies’ most recent wins—such as in Tapestry/Capri, IQVIA/Propel, and the airline mergers—followed more traditional theories of harm. We should see the agencies in the second Trump administration largely return to merger challenges rooted in more well-established legal theories focused on harm to consumers and rooted in economic analysis that are likely to be received more favorably by the courts.
The antitrust agencies in the new administration are likely to be more receptive to consent agreements and merger settlements that include divestiture packages, which were largely disfavored by the agencies under the Biden administration. In the new Trump administration, the trend towards “litigating the fix” may be stemmed in part, and the agencies will likely be more receptive to merging parties’ remedy proposals. FTC Commissioner Holyoak recently said that, in her view, merger cases should be looked at “holistically” and remedies should be “kept on the table.”17 New FTC leadership may also consider rescinding the agency’s Statement on the Use of Prior Approval Provisions in Merger Orders (Prior Approval Statement), which provided that in all divestiture orders merging parties must obtain prior approval from the FTC before closing any future transaction affecting any relevant market for which a violation was alleged.18
Last month the FTC announced a final rule revising the disclosure requirements for premerger filings under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR Act),19 which are significantly more burdensome for merging parties than the current requirements. The new rule—which was approved by the FTC in a unanimous 5-0 vote—is scheduled to become effective on February 10, 2025. The effective date may be postponed by at least 60 days if President-elect Trump decides to issue a freeze on pending federal regulations or otherwise could be delayed if the rule is challenged in court.
Given the bipartisan support for the final rule at the FTC, it may have staying power in the new administration, at least to start. In recent remarks at the ABA Antirust Fall Forum, Commissioner Holyoak discussed revisions to the final rule which were made in response to her concerns about the initial draft.20 She said that, once the new rule takes effect, she will “analyze the effects of the rule” with respect to the types of burdens being placed on parties, and will look at whether the information being collected is actually assisting the agencies evaluate the competitive harm of proposed transactions. She also said that she is committed to working with new leadership at the Antitrust Division to understand their perspective before deciding how to approach any potential changes to the new rule. The FTC can then address any concerns with the final rule by overturning the rule under the Congressional Review Act, through a new formal rulemaking, or by issuing informal guidance through the FTC’s Premerger Notification Office as it has in the past.
Private equity “roll-ups” have been a stated area of focus for the FTC and DOJ Antitrust Division in the Biden administration. As noted above, the 2023 Merger Guidelines (which are likely to be repealed or significantly revised in the new Trump administration) state that the agencies’ merger review will include evaluating a firm’s “pattern or strategy of multiple small acquisitions in the same or related business lines.” The 2023 Merger Guidelines also note that patterns of acquisitions may also be an unfair method of competition under Section 5 of the FTC Act.21 The antitrust agencies in the next administration are likely to take a more permissive view of the private equity model—and serial acquisitions by non-private equity actors—and we should expect the heightened scrutiny of these transactions to abate.
The heightened antitrust scrutiny on tech firms in the United States is unlikely to diminish significantly during Trump’s second term, at least in the near term. It is doubtful that the ongoing DOJ and FTC monopolization cases against major technology companies in the U.S. will be abandoned outright by a Republican-helmed FTC and Antitrust Division. Several of the investigations that are now being litigated in court were launched in the Trump administration. However, Trump has expressed skepticism about breakups as a remedy and the antitrust agencies in Trump’s second term may also argue, as have Congressional Republicans, that dominance among Big Tech firms is a threat to free speech, specifically with respect to suppressing conservative viewpoints, though any such free speech arguments are likely to be long shots and could be in some tension with an enforcement policy more focused on the consumer welfare standard.22
Both agencies have recently hired data scientists and other tech professionals in a commitment to pursuing antitrust enforcement in the tech industry, an indicator that such enforcement is here to stay. In 2019, the Republican-led FTC established the Technology Task Force “to enhance the Bureau [of Competition]’s focus on technology-related sectors of the economy, including markets in which online platforms compete.”23 In 2023, FTC Chair Khan announced a permanent Office of Technology in the agency “to keep pace with technological challenges in the digital marketplace by supporting the agency’s law enforcement and policy work.24 Continuity across administrations on this front is likely to continue.
Also likely to remain an enforcement focus is the hot topic of algorithmic pricing and collusion, which, along with the competitive impact of artificial intelligence more generally, is likely to be of interest to the agencies regardless of the particular administration.
The FTC in the Biden administration has had its sights set on the pharmaceutical industry in a bid to tackle high drug prices. The pharmaceutical industry is likely to remain an area of heightened enforcement focus for the FTC in the Trump administration, with the industry one of the few areas in which there is broad bipartisan support for antitrust enforcement.
However, while the focus on the industry is unlikely to be much lower (if at all) in the new FTC, the types of conduct the FTC has in its crosshairs may change. During the Biden administration, the FTC has been focused on more novel theories of harm—such as allegedly improper Orange Book listings even where there has not been a 30-month stay of generic approval,25 or bundling as a theory of harm in the merger context. In contrast, the FTC in the Trump administration is likely to be focused more on traditional theories of harm.
We expect a Republican-led FTC to prioritize rescission of the FTC’s 2022 Policy Statement Regarding the Scope of Unfair Methods of Competition Under Section 5 of the FTC Act (Section 5 Policy Statement).26 The Section 5 Policy Statement outlines a significant expansion of what the agency views as “unfair methods of competition” under Section 5, and was a tentpole of the FTC’s enforcement philosophy under the leadership of Chair Khan. The policy statement describes Section 5 as reaching “beyond the Sherman and Clayton Acts [the antitrust laws] to encompass various types of unfair conduct that tend to negatively affect competitive conditions. ” The Policy Statement also outlined how the agency might pursue such “standalone” unfair methods of competition claims under Section 5, and reflected a broad interpretation of the FTC's authority under Section 5.
The FTC’s issuance of the Section 5 Policy Statement followed its July 2021 withdrawal of the 2015 Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition” under the FTC Act (2015 Statement), which provided a more limited interpretation of the agency’s authority under Section 5.27 Whether the Republican majority FTC will issue a similar statement to the 2015 Statement, or merely withdraw the expansive 2022 iteration, remains an open question. But what is fairly certain is that the broad authority that Chair Khan’s FTC interpreted Section 5 to encompass will likely be circumscribed significantly, with the FTC’s authority under Section 5 likely to be interpreted much more narrowly in the new administration.
The FTC’s 2024 rule banning non-compete agreements (the Non-Compete Rule)28 was grounded in the agency’s view that such agreements constitute an “unfair method of competition” under Section 5 of the FTC Act. The rule—which was finalized in April 2024 but set aside by a Texas federal court29 in August—will most likely be on the chopping block in a conservative-majority FTC. Since its publication, the rule has faced significant opposition by House Republicans,30 Republican FTC Commissioners,31 and the business community.32
The fate of the Non-Compete Rule faces one of several possible paths in the Trump administration. The FTC in the new Trump administration could withdraw the rule, given skepticism that the FTC has authority to issue substantive rules in the first place.33 The FTC could also abandon the appeal34 of the Texas court’s decision setting aside the new rule. Or, new leadership could choose to let the appeal run its course with the expectation that the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit—or, potentially, the U.S. Supreme Court—will strike it down permanently and establish precedent limiting FTC competition rulemaking authority under the FTC Act.
On the heels of the Supreme Court’s 2023 opinion allowing parties to bring constitutional challenges to the FTC in federal district court,35 defendants in FTC merger lawsuits have increasingly raised constitutional challenges to the FTC’s authority in an effort to significantly limit the FTC’s enforcement authority.36 Recently, Republican Commissioner Ferguson articulated his view that for-cause removal protections provided to FTC Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) are unconstitutional. Similarly, Commissioner Holyoak has opined that broadening the agency’s rulemaking authority is unconstitutional, arguing, among other things, that the FTC “should not lose sight” of constitutional proscriptions and should “approach legislative rulemaking with circumspection.”37 It remains to be seen how a Republican-majority FTC could potentially affect the agency’s structure and mandate.
The FTC in the Biden administration has repeatedly expressed a desire to reinvigorate enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act. The Act—which prohibits charging different prices to competing sellers—has for several decades been viewed as out of step with modern antitrust principles. The current FTC appears to have multiple Robinson-Patman Act investigations underway—and a case may still be voted out before the end of the Biden administration. However, the FTC under the Trump administration may revert to the decades of nonenforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act.
While the antitrust agencies in Trump’s second term may be shifting their enforcement priorities, this may not result in a net reduction in the number of cases that see the light of day. Instead, we may begin to see new targets stand in for old ones. For example, Republican-led agencies will likely shift away from a focus on competition in the labor markets in their merger review analysis, and move towards applying the antitrust laws to other priorities, such as agreements regarding environmental, social and governance (ESG) policies and the alleged suppression of conservative voices on mainstream social media platforms.
With respect to ESG, Republican members of Congress have been actively advocating for antitrust enforcement targeting agreements on ESG practices for the last several years. In addition to holding numerous hearings, in July 2024 the House Judiciary Committee released an interim staff report38 that purportedly “details new direct evidence of a ‘climate cartel’ consisting of left-wing activists and major financial institutions that collude to impose radical environmental, social, and governance (ESG) goals on American companies.”39 Under the leadership of Chairman Jim Jordan (R-OH), the House Judiciary Committee also announced on July 30, 2024, that it is examining “whether existing civil and criminal penalties and current antitrust law enforcement efforts are sufficient to deter anticompetitive collusion to promote ESG-related goals in the investment industry.”40
In addition, during Trump’s first term the Antitrust Division challenged a number of mergers in the cannabis industry that would have been unlikely targets if subjected to a traditional antitrust analysis. Whether the agencies in the next Trump administration continue to target transactions in the cannabis (or other politically controversial sectors) remains to be seen.
All told, it would not be prudent to fully rely on the next administration implementing a purely traditional Republican “back to basics” antitrust philosophy rooted in a strict interpretation of the consumer welfare standard. Instead, we should expect the antitrust agencies in Trump’s second term to cater—at least to some extent—to the less predictable populist element that was instrumental in delivering President-elect Trump a second term, even if it results in antitrust policy that diverges from a more “traditional” conservative enforcement philosophy.
Importantly, state enforcers will also continue to play a role in antitrust enforcement during the next administration. State attorneys generals are co-plaintiffs with DOJ and FTC in a number of current high-profile cases related to Big Tech, information sharing, algorithmic pricing, and e-commerce. Thus, even if the federal antitrust agencies in the next Trump administration abandon some of the enforcement priorities that were prominent in the Khan/Kanter era, state antitrust enforcers may step in to take up the mantle.
Since 2020, Congressional Republicans have been pushing for legislation that would eliminate the FTCs competition enforcement mandate and make the U.S. Department of Justice the sole agency charged with enforcing the U.S. antitrust laws. The One Agency Act42which was waved through the House Judiciary Committee in April 2024—would integrate the FTC Bureau of Competition with the DOJ Antirust Division within one year of passage. While the FTC would be able to continue to pursue ongoing cases and consent decrees, the Antitrust Division would have the authority to terminate them, and the FTC would be barred from opening new investigations or bringing cases relating to the antitrust laws or unfair methods of competition under Section 5 of the FTC Act. This would be a significant overhaul of the U.S. antitrust enforcement landscape, and make President-elect Trump pick to lead the DOJ Antitrust Division even more significant. While chances of the bill passing are far from certain, Adam Cella, chief counsel for the House antitrust subcommittee, recently opined that there is a strong possibility that the One Agency Act will be passed when Republicans take a majority in both the House and the Senate next term. 43
We do not expect cartel enforcement to markedly change course during Trump’s second term, with some exceptions. Since the Deputy Assistant Attorney General (DAAG) for Criminal Enforcement at the DOJ Antitrust Division is not a political appointee, current leadership in the Antitrust Division’s criminal offices should remain relatively intact, providing consistency with respect to cartel enforcement. It is also expected that the Antitrust Division will continue to use the Procurement Collusion Strike Force (PCSF)—launched in November 201944—to target price fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation cases related to government procurement. The PCSF has expanded its enforcement efforts during the Biden administration through a growing number of interagency partnerships, and we expect the Antitrust Division to continue to use this tool in prosecuting government fraud and collusion.45 In addition, although there has been criticism that international antitrust enforcement has decreased at DOJ, there has been a recent apparent increase in cooperation between DOJ and other international enforcement agencies. Given that we do not anticipate significant turnover in criminal enforcement leadership at the Antitrust Division, we expect these cooperative relationships to continue during President-elect Trump’s second term. We also expect criminal enforcement of labor market cases to continue in the second Trump administration, as those cases originated during Trump’s first term.46
With respect to changes in criminal antitrust enforcement in the next administration, the Antitrust Division may target competitor collaborations on ESG initiatives, as this was an area of focus during Trump’s first term47 and has also been a topic championed by Congressional Republicans. We also expect to see DOJ’s prosecution of agreements among competitors that have a “dual distribution” relationship to be constrained by the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Brewbaker, which held that the per se rule does did not apply to an alleged bid-rigging agreement because the arrangement was also related to the parties’ vertical supply relationship.48 DOJ had argued in Brewbaker that it is “not uncommon” for companies to have both vertical and horizontal relationships,” and in applying per se review to such cases, “courts determine the orientation of the restraint by looking to the challenged agreement.”49 In November 2024 the U.S. Supreme Court denied DOJ’s writ of certiorari to review the Fourth Circuit’s decision.
Authored by Chuck Loughlin, Edith Ramirez, Jennifer Fleury, Ilana Kattan, Jill Ottenberg, Feven Yohannes, and Tianyu Dong.
The antitrust team at Hogan Lovells will be monitoring closely what promises to be a dynamic period of potential change and uncertainty with respect to antitrust enforcement in the United States.
Please do not hesitate to reach out to any member of our team for guidance on how antitrust enforcement in the new Trump administration may impact your business.
References
[1] In October 2024, FTC Commissioner Melissa Holyoak said that “Supreme Court precedent states unequivocally that [the] consumer welfare standard is the goal of antitrust . . . if the Commission wants to win cases, we need to focus on this. We need to present evidence of harm to consumers and harm to competition consistent with that standard.” See Mercatus Center, George Mason University, “A Conversation with FTC Commissioner Melissa Holyoak Hosted by Alden Abbott” (Oct. 30, 2024) available here. Commissioner Andrew Ferguson has said that while he believes that the consumer welfare standard is not limited to considerations of price and output, he considers case law to be unambiguous “that the principal question in antitrust cases is, what will be the price effects of this restraint or this transaction, and what will be the output effects?” Commissioner Ferguson has also said that he does not believe that antitrust should be used “as a panacea to solve a huge variety of social ills.” See Mercatus Center, George Mason University, “A Conversation with FTC Commissioner Andrew Ferguson Hosted by Alden Abbott” (June 13, 2024) available here.
[2] AAG Kanter has criticized the consumer welfare standard for failing to protect workers and other “beneficiaries of a competitive economy.” See Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, “Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter Delivers Remarks at New York City Bar Association’s Milton Handler Lecture” (May 18, 2022) available here.
[3] NPR, “Trump taps Musk to lead a 'Department of Government Efficiency' with Ramaswamy” (Nov. 12, 2024) available here.
[4] FTC Chairman Joseph Simons and AAG Makan Delrahim were confirmed 15 and 8 months, respectively, following President-elect Trump’s January 20, 2017 inauguration.
[5] CNBC, “Trump picks Rep. Matt Gaetz as attorney general” (Nov. 13, 2024) available here.
[6] See Rachael Bade, Politico, “Senate Republicans deliver a message to Trump: Gaetz’s confirmation is in jeopardy” (Nov. 19, 2024) available here.
[7] Molly Ball and Brody Mullins, The Wall Street Journal, “Biden’s Trustbuster Draws Unlikely Fans: ‘Khanservative’ Republicans” (March 25, 2024) available here.
[8] See Chris Morris, Fast Company “Matt Gaetz, Trump’s attorney general pick, and the FTC’s Lina Khan share some surprising views on Big Tech “ (Nov. 15, 2024) available here.
[9] See Department of Justice Antitrust Division, “Mergers Remedies Manual” (Sept. 2020) (withdrawn April 2022).
[10] Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, “ Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter of the Antitrust Division Delivers Remarks to the New York State Bar Association Antitrust Section” (Jan. 24, 2022) available here.
[11] Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, “Merger Guidelines” (December 2023) available here.
[12] See Justin Wise, Bloomberg Law “GOP FTC Commissioner Says She’d Consider Undoing Merger Guidance” (Oct. 30, 2024) available here. At the American Bar Association (ABA) Antitrust Section Fall Forum, held on November 14, 2024 in Washington, D.C., Commissioner Holyoak said that, while she thinks the FTC should continue to scrutinize “problematic deals,” in her view, the FTC should not “be in the business of just trying to stop deals to stop deals.”
[13] Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission “Vertical Merger Guidelines” (June 30, 2023) available here.
[14] It was over two years between when the FTC and DOJ voted to repeal the VMG in September 2021 and the agencies finalized the 2023 Merger Guidelines. See Federal Trade Commission press release, “Federal Trade Commission Withdraws Vertical Merger Guidelines and Commentary” (Sept. 15, 2021) available here.
[15] Federal Trade Commission Statement of Chair Lina M. Khan, Commissioner Rohit Chopra, and Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter on the Withdrawal of the Vertical Merger Guidelines Commission File No. P810034 (15 September 2021) available here.
[16] Department of Justice press release, “Justice Department Challenges AT&T/DirecTV’s Acquisition of Time Warner” (Nov. 20, 2017) available here.
[17] Sulaiman Abdur-Rahman, Law.com “'We Should Be Pragmatic': Meet the Possible Next FTC Chair” (Nov. 14, 2024) available here.
[18] Federal Trade Commission, “Statement of the Commission on the Use of Prior Approval Provisions in Merger Orders (Oct. 25, 2021) available here.
[19] Parties to acquisitions of voting shares, assets, and/or controlling interests in non-corporate entities must submit HSR filings to the FTC and the Antitrust Division and observe a waiting period before they may close their transaction, provided their transaction satisfies applicable HSR threshold tests and does not qualify for an HSR exemption.
[20] According to Commissioner Holyoak, the three categories of information that she requested be removed from the draft rule before agreeing to vote on the final rule include: (1) labor market/employee information; (2) drafts of transaction-related documents; and (3) expanded information related to prior acquisitions. See Federal Trade Commission, “ Statement of Commissioner Melissa Holyoak: Final Premerger Notification Form and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Rules” Commission File No. P239300 (Oct. 10, 2024) available here.
[21] See 2023 Merger Guidelines, Guideline 8.
[22] See e.g. The Heritage Foundation, ”Big Tech’s War on Free Speech” (Jan. 11, 2023) available here.
[23] Federal Trade Commission press release, “FTC’s Bureau of Competition Launches Task Force to Monitor Technology Markets” (Feb. 26, 2019) available here.
[24] Federal Trade Commission press release, “FTC Launches New Office of Technology to Bolster Agency’s Work” (Feb. 17, 2023) available here.
[25] See Hogan Lovells, “FTC continues to highlight FDA Orange Book patent listings” (April 5, 2024) available here.
[26] Federal Trade Commission, “Policy Statement Regarding the Scope of Unfair Methods of Competition Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act”, Commission File No. P221202 (Nov. 10, 2022) available here.
[27] The 2015 Statement directed the agency’s assessment and enforcement of standalone “unfair methods of competition” under Section 5 to be: (1) guided by the antitrust laws and the promotion of the consumer welfare standard; (2) evaluated under a framework similar to the rule of reason; and (3) limited when the Sherman or Clayton Acts are “sufficient to address the competitive harm arising from the act or practice.” See Federal Trade Commission, “Statement of the Federal Trade Commission On the Issuance of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition” Under Section 5 of the FTC Act (Aug. 13, 2015) available here.
[28] The Non-Compete Rule would ban the use of non-compete clauses nationwide, classifying such clauses as an unfair method of competition under Section 5 of the FTC Act. It would deem unlawful existing non-competes entered into with workers who are not “senior executives,” and would ban entering into new non-competes with any worker (including senior executives). See Hogan Lovells, “FTC finalizes rule banning non-compete agreements” (April 25, 2024) available here.
[29] Memorandum Opinion and Order, Ryan LLC v. Federal Trade Commission, No. 24- cv-00986 (N.D. Tex. July 3, 2024).
[30] See e.g., United States, Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. Letter to Chair Khan and Commissioners Slaughter, Wilson and Bedoya from Reps. Jim Jordan, Darrell Issa, Thomas Massie and Scott Fitzgerald (Feb. 14, 2023) available here. House Republican opposition to the Non-Compete Rule is not uniform, however. Representative Matt Gaetz (R-FL) expressed support for the rule in an amicus brief in the Texas case, arguing that the rule was a “reasonable exercise” of the FTC’s statutory rulemaking authority. See Amicus Brief of U.S. Representative Matt Gaetz in Support of Defendant Federal Trade Commission, Ryan v. FTC, No. 24-cv-0986 (N.D. Tex. June 4, 2024) available here.
[31] Federal Trade Commission, “Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Melissa Holyoak, Joined by Commissioner Andrew N. Ferguson, In the Matter of the Non-Compete Rule, Matter No. P201200 (June 28, 2024) available here.
[32] Among the plaintiffs in the Texas case that resulted in a decision preliminary enjoining enforcement of the rule was the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which touted the victory as “a big win in the Chamber’s fight against government micromanagement of business decision” and criticized the Non-Compete Rule as an “unlawful power grab that defies the agency’s constitutional and statutory authority and sets a dangerous precedent where the government knows better than the markets.” See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “U.S. Chamber Wins Preliminary Injunction in Lawsuit Over FTC Noncompete Agreements Ban” (July 3, 2024) available here.
[33] See “Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Melissa Holyoak Joined by Commissioner Andrew N. Ferguson (noting that “. . . based on the text and structure of the FTC Act, I am persuaded that a reviewing court would interpret Section 6(g) to authorize only procedural or internal operating rules, not substantive legal rules”).
[34] Notice of Appeal, Ryan v. FTC, No. 24-cv-0986 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2024) available here.
[35] Axon Enter. v. FTC, 598 U.S. 175 (2023).
[36] Challenges include: FTC’s “unfettered discretion” to choose whether to bring an enforcement action in administrative court or federal court violates the Non-Delegation Doctrine because that choice is a legislative decision “for which Congress provided no ‘intelligible principle’” to govern the FTC’s decision-making; the FTC’s administrative litigation process violates the Due Process Clause because the FTC “play[s] the role of investigator, prosecutor and judge;” FTC merger enforcement proceedings violate the Equal Protection clause because there is no rational basis for the process by which merger enforcement matters are assigned as between the FTC and DOJ; FTC administrative proceedings deny defendants their right to a jury trial in violation of the Seventh Amendment; and the FTC ALJs are insulated from at-will removal by the president by two layers of removal protection in violation of Article II.
[37] See Federal Trade Commission, “Oral Statement of Commissioner Melissa Holyoak”, In the Matter of the Non-Compete Clause Rule, Matter No. P201200 (April 23, 2024) available here.
[38] U.S. House of Representatives, Interim Staff Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, “Climate Control: Exposing the Decarbonization Collusion in Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Investing” (June 11, 2024) available here.
[39] U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee press release, “New Report Reveals Evidence of ESG Collusion Among Left-Wing Activists and Major Financial Institutions” (June 11, 2024) available here.
[40] U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee press release, “Jordan and Massie Demand Information From Over 130 Companies Surrounding Their Involvement with Woke ESG Cartel Climate Action 100+” (July 30, 2024) available here.
[41] Natalie Fertig, Politico, “This industry is high on the thought of Matt Gaetz as attorney general” (Nov. 18, 2024) available here.
[42] One Agency Act, H.R.7737, 118th Congress (2023-2024) available here.
[43] Global Competition Review, “House and Senate counsel: One Agency Act likely to succeed” (Nov. 18, 2024) available here.
[44] Department of Justice press release, “Justice Department Announces Procurement Collusion Strike Force: a Coordinated National Response to Combat Antitrust Crimes and Related Schemes in GovernmentProcurement, Grant and Program Funding” (Nov. 5, 2019) available here.
[45] Department of Justice press release, “Justice Department’s Procurement Collusion Strike Force Announces Four New National Law Enforcement Partners” (April 12, 2024) available here.
[46] Federal Trade Commission, “Federal Trade Commission and Justice Department Issue Joint Statement Announcing They are on Alert for Collusion in U.S. Labor Markets” (April 13, 2020) available here.
[47] The New York Times, “Justice Dept. Investigates California Emissions Pact That Embarrassed Trump” (Sept. 6, 2019) available here.
[48] U.S. v. Brewbaker, No. 22-4544 (4th Cir. 2023).
[49] Response Brief for the United States at 35, U.S. v. Brewbaker, 22-4544 (4th Cir. May 4, 2023).